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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.

vs.
EUGENE MEYERS,
Defendant-Appellant.

10944

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal from a criminal case wherein
the appellant seeks review of a judgment and conviction
of possession of narcotic drugs rendered by a jury on
the 8th day of February, 1967 before the Honorable
Merrill C. Faux, Judge.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The defendant was tried by Jury and convicted
of Possession of a Narcotic Drug, to wit: Heroin and
1

Demeral, in a three-day trial. A stay of execution was '
granted pending this appeal.
The defendant's motion to quash the search warrant was held before the Honorable Marcellus K.
Snow on April 20, 1966 and denied. Defendant's motion to suppress all items seized and any oral testimony
as to what was seized or observed was held on N ovember 29, 1965 before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft
and denied. The defendant's motion for new trial was
held before the Honorable Merrill C. Faux on the 3rd
day of March, 1967 and denied.
At the time of trial, the motion to suppress was
renewed and denied. A continuing objection was preserved by the defendant with permission of the trial
court, Honorable Merrill C. Faux.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's
ruling on the motion to quash the search warrant, mo·
tion to suppress the items taken from the premises and
oral testimony relating thereto and the admissibility
of statements of the defendant. In the alternative, the
appellant seeks a judgment of acquittal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant was charged with possession of nar·
cotic drugs, to wit: heroin, dilandid and demeral on
the 29th day of June, 1965.
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Officer Fran Kari of the Salt Lake City Police
Department, accompanied by Officers Donald D. Lindsey and Daniel W. Waters, went to a residence located
at 553 Third Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah on June
29, 1965 at approximately 9:30 a.m. (Tr. 41) The
avowed purpose of going to the residence was to serve
a "search warrant" which called for the pickup of one
Elizabeth Ann Glasgow, a minor, who was believed
to be harbored at the residence by the appellant and
Dave Beckstead. (Tr-154) The method of obtaining
the search warrant is referred below in Point II.
Upon their arrival, they observed a Mr. Brown,
who identified himself as a property-manager for TracyCollins Bank and Trust. (Tr-115) Mr. Brown stated
that he was there to investigate a complaint of nuisance.
(Tr-115) The residence had been rented to one Mrs.
Gibson on June 17, 1965 on a monthly basis. (Tr-116)
The rent, in fact, was current at the time of this incident. (Tr-132) The rental agreement, Exhibit 3, was
received in evidence over defendant's objection as to
no foundation. ( Tr-202) Mrs. Gibson was identified
as Virginia Hall through a photograph. (Tr-117) The
appellant was also outside of the residence when the
officers arrived. (Tr-42, 117) Mr. Brown had let
himself inside the residence and, after hearing the door
bell, answered the door and the defendant was at the
door. ( Tr-117) It was at this point that the officers
arrived. (Tr-119) Whereupon, Mr. Brown "gave them
permission to enter the house." (Tr-119) The defendant, who also entered, was standing behind the kitchen
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door. (Tr-119) Francis Kari informed Mr. Brown
that she had a search and seizure warrant and Mr.
Brown stated that it was alright. (Tr-154) In response
to her inquiry, the appellant said that he "was there
to mow the lawn." (Tr-156, 170) Francis Kari did
not show Mr. Brown or the defendant the warrant.
( Tr-42, 129, 165) Officer Lindsey having entered the
house talked to the defendant whereupon defendant
made the statement about mowing the lawn. (Tr-54)
The appellant did not ask for a warrant. (Tr-50, 54)
This officer testified that he entered the residence under
the authority of the search warrant and with the per·
mission of Mr. Brown. ( Tr-54) .

After entering the house the officers proceeded to
search the premises ultimately reaching an upstairs
locked bedroom, marked Bedroom "A" on Exhibits
2-D. (Tr-134, 139) Mr. Brown, the trustee, did not
have the key so Officer Lindsey dispatched Officer ,
Waters to obtain the same from the main office of
Tracy-Collins Bank and Trust ( Tr-54, 32) with the
permission of Mr. Brown. (Tr-32) Between the time
of entry into the house and the unlocking of Bedroom
"A", the appellant was permitted to leave. (Tr-33, 57)
No conversation was had concerning the locked Bed·
room "A".
Upon entering Bedroom "A", it became appar·
rent to all three officers that there was no one present.
( Tr-33, 44, 58) Whereupon, Officers Lindsey and
Waters began to open closet doors, bureau drawers,
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ruffle bed sheets and search under the mattresses and
bed. ( Tr-122, 211, 225) Their avowed purpose was to
find something as to the whereabouts of Elizabeth Ann
Glasgow. (Tr-34, 122) Officer Kari proceeded to inspect the night stand located near the bed. ( Tr-44,
158) Her stated purpose was to determine whether the
minor child had been there or where she might be.
(Tr-46)
The night stand is approximately 24-30 inches tall
with two or three drawers. ( Tr-77) It was so constructed that the bottom of the night stand was flush
against the rug. (Tr-119) The only opening was in
the back facing the wall. ( Tr-177) Officer Kari pulled
the night stand away from the wall and observed a
pa per sack between the floor and the bottom of the last
drawer, ( Tr-48) the contents of which were immediately placed on the bed and examined by Officers
Lindsey and Waters. (Tr-158) Out of this paper sack
came a plastic bag containing various pills, prescription
bottles and prescription blanks. (Exhibit 5). (Tr-197)
Moreover, a gum wrapper holding three demeral tablets, (Exhibits 6) another gum wrapper with demeral
pills, (Exhibit 8) a medicine container holding a clear
liquid, tested and identified as heroin, (Exhibit 9)
two clear gelatin found in an Old Gold cigarette package, (Exhibit 10) ( Tr-218) heroin, (Exhibit 10) and
a bottle containing heroin and demeral capsules (Exhibit 11) were obtained from the plastic bag. (Tr-113,
232, 235) Other items found in the plastic bag were
found to be pills, some of which contained codine.
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( Tr-232) This proposed Exhibit 7 and testimony relating thereto was stricken by the trial court on defense
counsel's motion ( Tr-233) and the jury was admonished. ( Tr-233)
The principle witness for the state in establishing
the possession charge comes from the testimony of
Elizabeth Ann Glasgow, a minor, and statements purportedly made by the defendant to Officer Lindsey
concerning the defendant's clothing, found in Bedroom
"A". These will be handled in turn.
Elizabeth Ann Glasgow, age 15, testified that she
was residing at 553 Third Avenue, Salt Lake City on
the last three weeks of June, 1965. (Tr-133) She
moved in on June 14, 1965, some two days before the
rental agreement had been executed. (Tr-141) She
may be mistaken as to the date. (Tr-141) She had
lived with the defendant, Dave Beckstead and Virginia
Hall. The defendant roomed with Virginia Hall and
the keys to the Bedroom "A" were held by both. (Tr135) The defendant's stay was apparently intermittant
and occasional. (Tr-136) In the latter part of June,
1965 she saw the defendant twice with something foreign in his hand, to wit, a bottle with pills, however
she never was able to identify the items nor did she
ever have a conversation with the defendant concerning
them. (Tr-137) She recognized the paper bag, Exhibit 5, found under the night stand (Tr-138), and
testified as follows :
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Q. (by Kay Lewis): Miss Glasgow, have you seen
the defendant himself take those pills or put any pills
into this bag, or a bag similar to this?

A. No, I haven't. (Tr-138)
She did see Virginia Hall get pills from the bag
(Tr-139) when only she and Virgiia Hall were present.
(Tr-146) Aside from white pills, larger than aspirin,
and prescription bottles in the plastic bag, (Tr-147)
she saw nothing else. ( Tr-148) Further, she never witnessed Virginia Hall give the defendant any pills.
(Tr-144) She left the house on the morning of June
29, 1965 and just prior to leaving, she saw or heard
the defendant and Virginia Hall fighting. (Tr-141,
255) Elizabeth Ann Glasgow, herself, was a runaway
and was aware that the Juvenile authorities were looking for her. (Tr-245)
Officer Donald B. Lindsey testified substantially
as to the same facts as heretofore indicated. In addition
thereto, he indicated that he had a conversation with
the defendant regarding the clothing and other ietms,
such as portable TV, Old Gold cigarettes, auto battery
and wrist watches, ( Tr-71) and driver's license bearing
the defendant's name and a different address. (Tr-301)
These items were seized at Mr. Brown's request for
safekeeping ( Tr-72) and remain in the police evidence
room.
In response to the question as to what items were
found in Bedroom "A", Officer Lindsey volunteered
the statement "There were prescription blanks, pill

7

bottles of various types, and clothing around, which
belonged to the defendant." (Tr-172) The latter's
statement regarding the ownership of the clothing was
stricken as being a conclusion on the part of the witness. ( Tr-173)
Thereafter, the prosecutor attempted to admit the
defendant's admission as to the clothing. (Tr-173) At
the defendant's request an out of jury hearing was
held. ( Tr-17 4) At this time, defense counsel moved
for mistrial on the basis that the defense counsel requested an out of jury hearing before the crucial question was asked with regard to any conversation had
with the defendant. ( Tr-17 4) This was denied. (Tr175)
During the out of jury hearing, Officer Lindsey
could not recall the dates of the conversation nor did
he take notes of the two conversations held with the
defendant. ( Tr-17 5) These conversations were had
after the defendant had been charged. ( Tr-17 5) and
he was considered a suspect in this possession charge.
( Tr-176) Defendant was not advised of his right to
counsel. ( Tr-176) The first conversation was a telephone call initiated by the defendant; (Tr-178) the
second, in the police car enroute from the city court
to jail, while he was in custody. (Tr-179) No Miranda
warning was given in either case. (Tr-180) At the time
of both converstaions, the Officer Lindsey was well
aware that defendant was represented by counsel. (Tr183) In both conversations, the officer indicated that

8
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I

the defendant wanted his clothes, tool box, car battery,
and records returned. (Tr-180) A motion to suppress
was made on the ground that the Miranda warnings
were not met and further on the grounds that since
there was no authority under the search warrant to
seize the items and since the consent of Mr. BroWI}.,
·'T
l)f p12ciD~,er y
~,q~ 1001 81/\Jf:N(J OllJ Tl:/C DcJ;,E'A.fiJ~fV
@:itelaail:ve efl tA!l 'Poi~onomHit aeetFla@; ~
IS4) and fm ther that the taking of the al>eve itsim
the clothes, portable TV, Old Gold cigarettes, wrist
watches and auto battery was unlawful and therefore
any conversation relating thereto would be tainted and
excludible on the "Poisonous fruit" doctrine; (Tr184) and further that the taking of the above items
were accomplished solely for evidentiary value, thus
coming with the prohibition of the "Mere evidence
rule." ( Tr-193) The motion was denied. ( Tr-190) A
continuing objection was preserved. (Tr-191)
The jury was reconvened and Officer Lindsey
testified as to the first telephone conversation and the
second police car conversation wherein the defendant
stated that he wanted some of the things taken from
Bedroom "A" returned, to wit: the clothing, auto battery, and auto accessory. (Tr-190) On cross-examination, he indicated that the conversations were had after
the instant case was initially dismised by the committing
magistrate. ( Tr-209) This matter was refiled. (Tr209).

Thereafter, Officers Lindsey and Waters proceeded to establish the identity of the items found in the
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plastic bag and established the chain of evidence. (Tr194, 202; 218-230)
Officer Fran Kari was recalled to testify that she
observed the defendant reach in his pocket and conceal
something under the rug on the stairway leading to
the upstairs (Tr-249) An out of jury-hearing was
held at defense counsel's request and an objection was
made regarding any of the above testimony as to the
hiding of the pills on the grounds that the State was
unable to show that the items were of narcotic character, which would fall within the categories listed in
the lnforma tion. ( Tr-164) This testimony was ordered
strickened and the jury admonished. ( Tr-251) Defense
counsel's motion for mistrial on the basis that the admonition by the court would not remove the prejudiced
effect imbedded in the minds of the jury was denied.
( Tr-251) Prosecutor was admonished by the trial
court. ( Tr-251)
The state rested. ( Tr-251) The defendant's mo·
tion to dismiss was denied. ( Tr-251) In considering the
defendant's motion to dismiss, the trial court expressed
doubt as to submitting the matter to the jury since
there had not been any proof that the defendant knew
of its narcotic character. (Tr-253) However, the trial
court then considered the stricken testimony of Francis
Kari as to observing the defendant secreting some items
under the carpet. ( Tr-254-255) The trial court recog·
nized the error of striking the testimony from the jury
and yet restoring it for the purpose of considering the

10

motion to dismiss. ( Tr-257) Trial court reversed his
ruling and permitted the testimony of Francis Kari
to be re-instated for the purpose of this motion, (Tr259) and on the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence.
(Tr-266, 275)
At this point, defense counsel requested that the
items be produced and examined as to narcotic character
to rebut the inference that is in the minds of the jury
that the items were narcotics. (Tr-259) The items
were, in fact, co-mingled with other pills at the police
station and could not be separated or found at this
time. ( Tr-259) The trial was continued for one week
with the defendant's consent, for the purpose of locating the pills and analyzation. ( Tr-261)
As the trial resumed a week later, after much discussion as to the court's procedure, Officer Fran Kari
was cross-examined by defense counsel. ( Tr-278) She
did not see anything in the defendant's hands which
was passed underneath the carpet of the stairway,
(Tr-278) and she could not recall what the pill and
capsule looked like. (Tr-279-280) She turned the items
over to the narcotics man unmarked. ( Tr-282)
Thereafter, Officer Donald B. Lindsey was recalled on further direct examination. ( Tr-289) Over
defense counsel's objection, he was permitted to testify that items turned over to him by Fran Kari were
a red capsule, which in his opinion was secondal, nonnarcotic and a pill which was tuinal, non-narcotic. (Tr-
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300) He had no opinion as to another item which he
found himself. (Tr-314)

Defense counsel's motion to dismiss was renewed.
and denied. ( Tr-314) Motion for mistrial was renewed
and denied. The word "dilaudid" was stricken from the
Information and the jury instructed to disregard it. '
( Tr-315) One specific motion for mistrial was renewed
with respect to State's Exhibit 7 and 17, which established that codine was also found in the Bedroom "A"
(Tr-316), which evidence and exhibits were stricken
from the jury. This motion was denied. (Tr-317)
The motion to suppress was again raised and denied.
Tr-317) The defense rested with a statement that no
evidence could be presented in behalf of the defendant
without jeopardizing his rights in the unlawful search
and seizure or his rights on the ultimate issue of guilt
or innocence. ( Tr-318)
The matter was submitted to the jury and the defendant was found guilty of the charge. Defendant's
motion for new trial was argued on March 3, 1967 and
denied. ( Tr-353) A stay of execution of the sentence
was granted pending this appeal upon the filing of a
certificate of probable cause signed by Justice A. H.
Ellett. ( Tr-354)
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENY·
ING THE APPELLANT STANDING TO SUP·
PRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLA·

12

TION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
AGAINST UNLAWFUL SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES.
This is a case of first impression in the State of
Utah on the precise issue herein presented. In presenting this matter, it should be kept in mind that the defendant's initial motion to suppress was denied after
hearing on the sole basis that the defendant, under the
facts hereafter referred to, did not have standing to
raise the objection as to the violation of his constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure. The
hearing on this motion is included in the appeal transcript on pages 24-85, inclusive. At the time of the
trial, the motion to suppress was renewed at the commencement of the trial and after the State rested and
denied each time. (Tr-92). A continuing objection
was preserved. ( Tr-92) Since the precise issue is that
of standing to assert a constitutional right, reference
to the evidence in support of this point on appeal
will not be limited to testimony adduced at the time
of the hearing on the motion to suppress, but will include all the evidence produced at trial.
The issue of standing is essentially two fold: Did
the defendant have sufficient constitutionally protected
interest in the premises searched, to wit: 553 Third
Avenue, or Bedroom "A" (?) Did the defendant have
a sufficient legal interest in the items seized where the
offense with which he is charged requires some dominion
and control by the defendant (?)
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The question whether a specific interest in the
premises unlawfully searched is a sufficient basis to
object to an introduction of evidence so obtained is
well settled. The United States Supreme Court discusses at length the interest in the premises as a requisite of an accused's standing to raise the question of
the constitutionality of the search. In the leading case
of United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 96 L. Ed. 59,
(1951), the court sweeps away any heretofore subtle
distinctions as that of lessee, sublessee, tenant by sufferance of licensee and puts the issue of standing squarely
upon the principles which appellant contends should
be herein employed.
The defendant, Jeffers, stored contraband narcotics in a hotel room without the knowledge of the
occupants who had permitted him to use the room.
Without search or arrest warrants, police officers
gained access to the room in the absence of the defendant and the occupants, searched it, and seized the narcotics. On the basis of the seized narcotics, defendant
was convicted of possession.
In an opinion by Justice Clark, six members of
the court held that the constitutional guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizures had been violated,
notwithstanding that "no property rights shall exist"
in contraband goods, and that the defendant had standing to have the evidence suppressed although the illegal seizure was made in rooms rented by other persons.
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In the case at bar the officers searched without a
warrant as the instrument itself gave no authority to
search but rather to arrest and take into possession the
juvenile. The Jeffers case, supra, as in this case should
be resolved without regard to largely historical property distinctions. Justice Clark in the Jeffers case
comments on such distinctions when they are in conflict
with principle in this manner,
"The search and seizure are therefore, incapable of being untied. To hold that this search
and seizure were lawful as to the defendant
would permit a quibbling distinction to overturn
a principal which was designed to protect a fundamental right."
The government in the Jeffers case argued that
the search did not invade the defendant's privacy and
he therefore lacked the necessary standing to suppress.
The significant act according to the government was
the seizure, not the search. Because the defendant,
Jeffers, had not paid the rent or was not a sublessee,
he could not object to the search. The search was secondary. The court rejected such reasoning and has
placed to rest such intangible subtleties which heretofore were largely founded upon real property concepts
where such concepts are inconsistent with constitutional
rights.
Permission to use the room is all that appellant
herein must show to have the requisite standing to
object to its search. The fact that his personal clothing
and drivers license were in the room, supported by

15

Elizabeth Glasgow's testimony of the interval of occu.
pancy by appellant herein ( Tr-136) , and the def end.
ant's admission as to the return of his clothes (Tr-195196), conclusively permit him to object and to suppress
the evidence therein obtained. The trial court had all of
this evidence before him after the State rested.
The Jeffers case, supra, also is cited by appellant
for another novel proposition. The government contended that no property rights within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment exist in narcotics because they
are contraband goods in which the legislature declared
no property rights exist. In disposing of this assertion
the court said,
"We are of the opinion that Congress, in abrogating property rights in such goods merely in·
tended to aid in their forfeiture and thereby pre·
vent the spread of the traffic in drugs rather
than to abolish the exclusionary rule formulated
by the courts in furtherance of the high purposes
of the Fourth Amendment. See Re Fried, 161
F.2d 453, 1 ALR 2d 996 (1947} ."
Since the evidence illegally seized was contraband,
the appellant was not entitled to have it returned to
him. It being his property, for purposes of the exclu·
sionary rule, he was entitled to motion to have it sup·
pressed as evidence on his trial.
On the second issue, the lower court offered the
defendant the horns of a dilemma, to wit: to object
to the introduction of evidence on the ground it was
obtained by an illegal search and seizure, the accused
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in order to show his standing to raise the objection must
show an interest in the items searched or seized; on the
other hand, by doing so he may establish an element
.
'
of the offense with which he is charged.
'i\There, as here, the offense charged involves unlawful possession of the narcotics, there must be some
dominion and control over the narcotics. State v. Winters, 16 Uta:h 2d 139, 396 P.2d 872, (1964). At the
hearing on the motion to suppress, by disclaiming his
interest, he loses his standing to object. At this hearing, had he claimed any dominion or control of the
narcotics, he would have· waived his defenses since any
admission as to dominion and control would have been
tantamount to a confession of one of the essential
elements of the charge. The defendant thus impaled
on the horns or the dilemma went to trial.
The distinguished jurist Learned Hand. addressed
himself to this. novel in~ongruity in Connolly, et al v.
Medalie, 58, F.2d 629, (1932) where he said:
"The power to suppress the use of evidence
unlawfully obtained is a corollary of the :power
to regain it. The prosecution is forbidden to
profit by a wrong whose remedies are inadequate
for the injury, unless they' inClude protedioil
against any use of the property seized as a means
of conviction.

*

*

*

Men may wince at admitting th;it they were
the owners, or in possession, of contraband property; may wish at once to secure the remedies
of a possessor and avoid the perils of the part,
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but equivocation will not serve. If they come as
they must take on. that role, with enough
detail to encase them without question. The
Petitioners at bar shrank from that predicament·
but they were obliged to choose one horn of th~
dilemma.''
vict~s,

More properly, the prosecution herein is the party
impaled on the horns of the dilemma. Jones v. United
States, infra, Ball v. State, ____ Miss ..... , 194 S.2d 502
(1967), United States v. Dean, 50 F.2d 905 (1931).
In all of the aforesaid cases, the courts clearly indicated
that where the indictment involves an assertion that the
property was in the possession of or control of the
defendant, the State cannot maintain that he was the
owner of the property for the purpose of convicting
him and, yet, was not the owner for the purpose of the
search. In Ball v. State, supra, the court further stated
that even if the defendant put his objection to the search
on a false ground, as the prosecution claims, the search
was nevertheless against his will and consent. The
Mississippi Court found no merit in the prosecution's
contention that the defendant claimed that he had
rented the premises and was not in possesion and con·
trol. The instant case is unlike State v. Montayne,
18 Utah 2d 38, 414 P2d 958 (1966), which held that the
sole pre-requisite is that the defendant claimed a pro·
prietary or possesory interest in the searched or seized
property. The Montayne case dealt with the charge of
Robbery and Grand Larceny, not possession.
The instant case is shot through with this incon·
sistent position assumed by the prosecution. It is note·
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worthy that the prosecutor, during the motion to suppress, initially makes no mention of the lack of standing of the defendant; rather he relies solely on the
search warrant, (Tr-27} and permission of Mr. Brown,
trustee of the premises. ( Tr-27) The lower court in
his remarks at the conclusion of the motion makes no
mention on the issue of standing although it was clearly
raised. ( Tr-84) The standing issue was raised in the
lower court's memorandum, wherein the court held
that the defendant, having disclaimed .any interest in
the premises or items seized, waived his right to object
to the search and seizure. Memorandum, page 9. There
is serious doubt as to whether there can be any consent
to search where the defendant had not been fully advised of his rights under the Fourth Amendment.
United States v. Nickrasch, 367 F.2d 740 (1966},held
under the principles of Johnson v. Zerbst, infra, that
no consent was shown for f allure to so advise the defendant.
Other jurisdictions have had the _instant issue presented. Compare such statements as:

Wiggin v. State, 206 P.373 (1922)-"All
right"
Helfen v. State, 181 P.2d 862 (1947)-"No,
help yourself"
Edwards v. State, 177 P.2d 143 (1947}"Look it over. You won't find anything."

In each instance, the above jurisdictions held that there
was no waiver.
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A significant distinction should be observed in
determining the waiver question. Each of the cases
relied upon the lower court in concluding that a waiver
was shown dealt with waivers made by the defendant
or his counsel during the course of the trial or with
waivers that unequivocally disavowed any property
interest in the premises or items seized. The facts in each
of the cases are distinguishable. Moreover, six of the
ten cases were decided before United States v. Jeffers,
supra, which has flatly rejected the historical property
distinctions as a basis for determining the standing
issue. No federal decisions decided after the Jeffers
case were cited by the lower court. It is doubtful that
the federal cases would still prevail since the current
trend in this general area is one of establishing a policy
against any waiver or disclaimer in the absence of clear
and convincing proof.

'
,
1

i

'
'

A waiver of a right presupposes that the right
exists. In this case, the lower court found that the de·
fendant has standing but waived his right to contest
the illegal search and seizure because he, in answer to
the officer's inquiry, said, "I am here to mow the lawn."
(Tr-49, 156, 170) This is clear error.

The doctrine of waiver is well embedded in our
law. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, :
82 L. Ed 1461 ( 1938) states that any waiver must be !
shown to be intelligently and freely made. When the !
State relies upon a waiver of any constitutional right,
it is incumbent that the waiver be proved by clear and
1
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convincing proof. 79 CJS 812. The evidence as to waiver
rests solely upon the statement that the defendant
stated that he was there to mow the lawn. This falls
drastically short of the criteria set forth in the Johnson
case.
The statement was made after the officer entered
the premises with Mr. Brown's permission. (Tr-54)
Moreover, officer Fran Kari informed Mr. Brown that
she had a searcch and seizure warrant although she
never exhibited it. (Tr-154, 42, 29, 165) This amounts
to submission to official coercion of the type .that is
condemned in Wiggin v. State, 206 P.373 (1922) The
defendant has a right to assume the warrant was
valid. Coleman v. Commonwealth, 219 Ky. 139, 292
S.W. 771 ( 1934). The obvious show of force of the
three police officers, initial entry, and repres.entation
of a legally valid search and seizure warrant is .not a
waiver or consent freely given, but mere acquiescence
to the powers of the police. This cannot meet the test
expressed in Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649
(1951) where the court stated:
"The obtaining of a search warrant may be
waived by an individual and he may give his
consent to search and seizure but such waiver or
consent must be proven by clear and positive
testimony and there must be no duress or coercion, actual or implied, and the government must
show a consent that is unequivocal and specific,
freely and intelligently given and the burden
of the government is particularly heavy ... "
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Appellant herein was charged with a possession:
0ffense and possession offenses present special prob.~
lems. In the Jeffers and Jones cases the courts clearly,
held no invasion of privacy need be established before •
the accused has standing to object to a search and
seizure.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in the case of DeForte v. Mancusi, decided in
Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, June 28th, 36 Law
Week, Page 2022, ( 1967) in expanding the standing '
to suppress concept held that the mere fact that the,
search was directed against a person will give him
standing to object to evidence illegally obtained at i
trial.

I

1

The United States Supreme Court recently re· i
solved the dilemma in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.;
257, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1960). The accused was charged
with unlawful possession of narcotics located in an
apartment in which he was a guest of the owner. Jus·
tice Frankfurter, speaking for eight members of the
court, held that because of accused's presence in the
apartment, the search was legal. He had standing to
raise the question of the legality of the search and he i
did not lose this standing merely because he fails to :
I
allege either that he owned or possessed the property ~
seized or that he had a possessory interest in the prem· ·
ises searched. The possession on the basis of which it ;
is sought to convict suffices to give the accused standing i
and his timely motion to suppress should have been
granted.

22

In the Jones case, the court in laying down the :mle
said:
"The same element in this prosecution which
has caused a dilemma, i.e., that possession both
convicts and confers standing eliminates any
necessity for a preliminary showing of an interest in the premises searched or the property
seized which ordinarily is required when standing is challenged."

•

•

•

"The petitioner's conviction flows from his possession of the narcotics at the time of the search.
Yet the fruits of the search upon which the conviction depends were admitted into evidence on
the ground that Petitioner did not have po·ssession of narcotics at that time."

"It is not consonant with the amenities, to put
it mildly, of the administration of criminal justice to sanction such squarely contradictory assertions of power by the government. The possession on the basis of which petitioner is to
be and was convicted suffices to give him standing."
Under this case, appellant herein suggests that the
filing of the Information against the accused gave
appellant the standing as a matter of law to object
to the search and seizure. The prosecution, thus committed, must permit the accused to object to the search.
If the search be otherwise sustained then the conviction must stand. The prosecution cannot give the accused standing by its own act and then deny him standing to object because of a restriction on the right to
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object which only the prosecution can enjoy. Such a
one sided use of a concept, the contours of which escape
use by the defendant, is repugnant to any system ol
fairness.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENY.
ING THE MOTION TO QUASH THE
SEARCH 'VARRANT IN THAT THE ISST.:ANCE THEREOF WAS VIOLATIVE OF THE
DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT.
AGAINST UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE.

1

It is submitted that the search warrant referred'
to in the entire record was obtained without the proper•
safeguards as provided under the Juvenile Court legis·.
lation, Utah Criminal Code and State and Federal'
Constitution, Fourth Amendment.

Utah Code Annotated, 55-10-23 (as amended:.
1953) is the applicable statute. (The new Juvenile
Court Act did not take effect until July 1, 1965.) This:
provides:

"Where it appears to the court on petition
filed by any person who in the opinion of the
court is bona fide acting in the interest of any
child, that there is reasonable cause to suspect.
that such child under the age of 18 years has
been or is being ill-treated, is dependent or neg·
lected, in any place within the jurisdiction .of
the court, in a manner likely to cause the child
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unnecessary suffering, or to be injurious to its
health or morals, the court may issue a warrant
authorizing any probation or other peace officer
named therein to search for the child . . . "
This section further provides must be served upon
the parent or guardian or on the custodian of the
premises.
Under this provision the search warrant was issued.
(Defendant's Exhibit D-1, (hearing on the motion to
suppress) It is respectfully submitted that the above
provision is blatantly unconstitutional in that it violates the mandate contained in the Utah Constitution,
Article 1, Section 14 which states that:
" ... and no warrant shall be issued but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized."
This constitutional provision places a limit on the
authority of the legislature in enacting search warrant
provision for special circumstances. Thus if the Juvenile Court statute does not meet the constitutional mandate, it must fall and the practices thereunder must fall
also.
This court has so held in Allen v. Lindbeck, 97
Utah 471, 93 P.2d 920 (1939). This court struck down
a statute which permitted the court to issue a search
warrant for property "whenever any person shall make
affidavit before the court of competent jurisdiction
that he have reason to believe and does believe that
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any receptacle . . . is in the possession of any persor
engaged in any business specified herein." J usti~
McDonough stated:
"Since our constitution requires a showing ol
probable cause to support a search warrant an~
Section 95-2-10 requires merely an affidavit on
information and belief, we hold, in line with tht
over-whelming weight of authority in the federal
and state courts, that such affidavit does not;
meet the constitutional requirements and thti
statute is therefore void."
'
Under this case, the conclusion is inescapable that tht:
Juvenile Court statute insofar as it authorizes the issu.i
ance of a search warrant is in derogation with the Utan\
Constitution and is therefore void. This conclusion IB[
re-enforced when one considers that the current Juve·:
nile Court Act requires an affidavit sworn to by a peace\
officer and requires a finding by the court of probable'
cause to believe before a search warrant is issued. See
Utah Code Annotated 55-10-lll (as amended, 1965)
Assuming arguendo that the "reasonable cause to
suspect" requirement of the statute can be saved by an
interpretation by this court that reasonable cause ~
contended to be probable cause. (See Allen v. Lina·
beck, supra at page 923), this interpretation could not
restore the statute to constitutionality. The "oath and
affirmation" requirement is conspicuously lacking in
the Juvenile Court procedure. The statute requirei
merely that a petition be filed. This falls short of an
oath and affirmation. In the instant case, a verified
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petition was filed. (See recital contained in the search
and seizure warrant) . Nevertheless, this does not restore the constitutional requirement because the statute
requires the same person who files the petition be the
same person who makes application for the search and
seizure warrant. Here, there is no showing that officer
Fran Kari was the same person who filed the petition
yet she obtained the search and seizure warrant. In fact,
she did not sign the petition. ( Tr-16) .
Following the same arguendo, and aside from the
breach in procedure utilized in the instant case, the
statute does not permit a search and seizure warrant
in cases where the assertion is that of delinquency. This
statute is an emergency procedure and restricts the
Juvenile Court in the issuance of warrants to cases
where the child "has been or is ill-treated, is dependent
or neglected, . . . , in a manner likely to cause the child
unnecessary suffering, or to be injurious to its health
or morals." The issuance of the warrant is not provided
in cases where the allegation is for delinquency as being
a runaway. This statute is an emergency procedure
designed to protect the child where immediate and
necessary action is required. No emergency facts were
provided the Juvenile Court Judge, nor were any stated
in the search and seizure warrant itself. In Re State in
the Interest of Johnson, no U 500, 175 P.2d 486
(1946)

The statement of Officer Kari in obtaining the
search warrant was insufficient as a matter of law in
}.7

providing the Juvenile Court Judge sufficient informa.
tion with which to make an independent judgment on
the reasonable or probable cause to issue the warrant
All of her statements were based upon hearsay anu
informants, the reliability of whom was never shown.
Clearly, hearsay alone will not. render the search war.
rant invalid. However, where the information as to tht
whereabouts of Elizabeth Ann Glasgow was obtaineu
from "her investigation" or "after contacting several
people," and no further inquiry made or request bi
the Judge, there is no basis for the issuance of the searcn
warrant. (Tr-12, 14) Nothing appears to have been
observed personally by Officer Fran Kari, nor Wal
there any assertion that she had personal knowledge.
(Tr-15) Illustrative facts are found in Aguilar v.;
Texas, 378 U.S. 109 (1964) where the court struck
down a search warrant on the grounds that the magis·:
trate "necessary accepted without question the infor·
mant's suspicions, belief and mere conclusions" ana
was "not able to judge for himself the persuasiveness
of the facts relied upon ... to show probable cause,"
and Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 Sup. Ct.
725, 46 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1960) where the court said:
"We hold in N abhanson v. United States ...,
that an affidavit does not establish probable cause
which merely states the affiant's belief that there
is cause to search, without stating the facts upon
which that belief was based."
It is respectfully submitted that the procedures
in Juvenile Court are to be no less scrupulous with
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regard to constitutional rights merely because of the
immaturity of its wards. In Re Williams, 267 N.Y.S.
2d 91 ( 1966) The statute in question and the procedure
employed must be examined by this court in light of
the In Re Gault, 35 L. W. 4399 (1967) and principles
set forth therein. The appellant asks foresight, not hindsight.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PER·
MITTING ORAL TESTl1\i10NY CONCERN.
ING ITEMS SEIZED BY THE POLICE A'I
THE REQUEST AND WITH THE CONSENT
OF THE LANDLORD.
The police, after discovering the narcotics, proceeded to remove men's clothing, a portable TV, Old
Gold cigarettes, auto battery and wrist watches. (Tr71) Moreover, a drivers license was confiscated. (Tr301) None of these items were listed in the search
warrant nor were any of the items claimed by the State
to be evidence of the whereabouts of Elizabeth Ann
Glasgow. These items were taken from Bedroom "A"
at the request of and with the consent of Mr. Brown,
the trustee, ( Tr-71) despite the fact that the rent was
fully paid. (Tr-132) Nor could it be successfully maintained that the items taken were contraband or suspected stolen property. (Tr-72) The items were taken
for safekeeping in the police evidence room. (Tr-72)
1'he items themselves were not produced at trial, with
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the exception of the drivers license, Exhibit 18. Ora
statements of the defendant concerning the return 0
some of the items were introduced through the tes!imony of Officer Lindsey, over defendant's objection
( Tr-180-193) Trial court denied the motion to su~
press the oral statements.
The testimony of the officer concerning oral aa.
missions as to ownership of the items taken is clearlr,
inadmissible as "fruits from the poisonous tree.
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S
385, 40 S. Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 ( 1920).
It is well settled in Utah that a landlord or similar'.
person cannot give a consent to search and seize ite!lli
from a room rented by another party. Stoner v. Ca//.!
fornia, 376 U.S. 483 ( 1964), Chapman v. Uniteli
States, 365 U.S. 610 ( 1961), State v. Louden'
379 U.S. 1 ( 1964) . It needs no legal gymnastics to'I
suggest that this same principle applies equally wi~!
the removal of items from the room and testimonr;
relating thereto. The removal of the items wa1
clearly without any legal sanction Or justification
The consent of the property trustee cannot bind th1,
defendant nor vicariously convey away his rights. Tht!
trustee of the property, acting as a landlord, had no
•I
right to declare the premises abandoned, or otherw1s1\
evict the tenants and secure the personal items of the,
tenants where the rent was current and no notice haai
been served. The items having been legally confiscated,:!
any oral testimony is suppressable under the poison]
I

1

1
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I

fruit doctrine. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471. (1963)
See McGinnis v. United States, 227 F.2d 598 (1st
Cir. 1955) where testimony as to what the searching
officers observed during an illegal search was excluded.
The court said in discussing the full measure of the constitutional protection:
"We find no basis in the cases or in logic for
distinguishing between the introduction into evidence of physical objects illegally taken and the
introduction of testimony concerning objects illegally observed. We are aware of no case which
makes this distinction. Moreover, it seems to
us that the protection offered by the constitution against unreasonable search and seizure
would be narrowed down to a virtual nullity by
any such view of law, which in effect would grant
to the victims of unreasonable search and seizure
the rather unsubstantial right to be convicted on
the basis of evidence which was illegally observed rather than evidence which was illegally
taken."
In French v. State, 198 So.2d 668 (1967), the
Florida court states:
"Once the trial court found that the tangible
evidence obtained, as a result of an illegal search
and seizure, could not be introduced into evidence it should have precluded the introduction
into evidence of oral or written confessions of
the appellants, which were obtained after the
police official confronted them with the tangible
evidence which was illegally seized."
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The admission of the drivers license is clearh!
•I
error. Under the above cases, the court should havij
been excluded the same from the jury. All of the iteru I
seized and the oral testimony describing the items a1'
men's suits, shorts, etc., were used as evidence probatiw\
to the defendant's occupancy of Bedroom "A". Theit:
items were taken as mere evidence to establish tht[
element of possession. The "mere evidence rule" wouldl
preclude the taking of such items. Gouled v. Unitea\'
States, 255 U.S. 298 (1960). Clearly, this case hai
been overruled, inWarren, Maryland Penitentiary V.\
Hayden, 87 S. Ct. 1642 (1967). However the priori
case was applicable when this matter was heard bythe,
trial court and should have been binding upon him
and this court. The court, in the Gouled case, stated
that search warrant "may not be used as a means o!
gaining access to a man's house or office and paperi
solely for the purpose of making searches to secure
evidence to be used against him in a criminal or penal
proceedings. . . " This case, through the principles
enunciated in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, (1963)
should be given serious consideration by this court in
determining the scope of police searches as applied
in the State of Utah. The standard of reasonablenesi
is the same under the Fourth Amendment and the
Fourteenth amendment. The words of Learned Hand
is particularly applicable in the instant case insofar as
the mere evidence rule is involved. He stated that the
"limitations upon the fruits to be gathered tend to
limit the quest itself." Police exploratory searches and
1
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seizures would thus be prevented. By reason of the
Fourth Amendment, which is designed to protect the
right of privacy, "the police may not rummage among
personal effects, no matter how formally perfect their
authority may be." They may not seize them. If they
do, they may not be used in evidence. Any invasion
whatsoever of those personal effects is "unreasonable"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."
Warden v. Hayden, supra, (Justice Douglas, dissenting opinion.)
The Hayden case admittedly rules out the heretofore distinction between mere evidence and fruits,
instrumentalities and contraband. No such distinction
was found to be warranted by the language of the
Fourth Amendment. The right of privacy is no more
disturbed in a search for mere evidence then in a search
for the other. The Hayden case, however, is not applicable here for two reasons: ( 1) the decision was
handed after the trial of the instant case, ( 2) the facts
are distinguishable in that the search in the Hayden
case was deemed valid as a result as "hot pursuit" and
the officers were looking for a robbery suspect and items
to connect the suspect to the robbery. In the instant
case, the initial search was unlawful as being executed
through an improper warrant and on consent of the
landlord not binding on the part of the defendant.
Moreover, the defendant was not a suspect for the
commission of any wrongdoing at the time of the search
nor were the officers looking for any items to connect
the defendant to any wrongdoings. They were only
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looking for evidence which would lead them to tn1
whereabouts of the delinquent child. ( Tr-34, 122, 461
To permit the instant search to stand is to give th:'.
police unlicensed discretion to seek out items in thi
far corners of houses, and intrude into the private af.
fairs, documents, and family records, thereby violatini
the sanctity of the home far beyond that which b
necessary to perform their duties, preserving the peaci.

1

POINT IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
SUPPRESSING THE STATEMENTS OF THE
DEFENDANT MADE WHILE IN THE CUS·
TODY OF A POLICE CAR AFTER THE
CHARGE WAS FILED IN THE ABSENCE
OF THE WARNINGS UNDER MIRANDA V.

ARIZONA.

A hearing was held outside of the presence ol
the jury regarding certain statements made by the de·
fendant to Officer Lindsey. (Tr-175) Two conversa·
tions were had concerning the clothing found in Bed·
room "A", each probative to the possible occupancy ol
Bedroom "A". ( Tr-177) Each conversation was afte1
the complaint had been filed and the defendant wa:
a definite suspect. ( Tr-176) The first conversatior
was a phone call initiated by the defendant; the seconr
was a conversation in a police car while transportin!
the defendant from the court room to the jail. (Tr
178, 179) The phone conversation was to the effec
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that the defendant wanted some things that had been
taken from the apartment, however, he "didn't care
to say much about it. [case]" (Tr-179) The second
conversation, in the custody of a police car, began by
a discussion of "our various philosophies concerning
drugs and narcotics, and crime, in general." (Tr-179)
At this time, defendant said he wanted his stuff back.
(Tr-179) Officer Lindsey at the time was well aware
that the defendant was represented by counsel. ('fr181) The Miranda warnings were ignored in each
conversation.
The trial court admitted both conversations over
defendant's objection. The appellant submits that
while there may be some justification for the trial court
not to exclude the first conversation over the phone as
being voluntary, non-custodial and non-interrogatory,
there is no justification for not excluding the sec_ond
conversation. This conversation was had while the defendant was a suspect; infact, after he had been charged
by the interrogating officer. (Tr-183) He was in the
physical custody of Officer Lindsey in the police c;:ar
and the admission was the result of a subtle .interrogation process by the same officer. Absence of Miranda
warnings renders the statements made inadmissible.
(Tr-181) Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966},
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964} The admission of the statements constitutes reversible error
without regard to the prejudicial effect of said statements. The harmless error rule does not apply to the
admission of statements taken in violation of the privi-
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lege against self-incrimination. Spano v. New YorR
360 U.S. 315, (1959); Haynes v. Washington, an
U.S. 503 (1962).

I

CONCLUSION
The appellant respectfully submits that the lower
court committed error in rejecting appellant's claims
with regard to the evidence and oral testimony at the
time of the trial. Disclaimer or waiver is not to be
taken lightly where constitutional rights are at stake;
nor should police be permitted to use the pretext of a
search warrant obtained in Juvenile Court in order to
search and seize items totally unrelated to the purpose
of the search warrant which goes beyond the ends con·
templated by the Juvenile Court Act. Oral testimonr
regarding items found and defendant's statemenb
were put before the jury in total violation of the con·
stitutional mandates which should not be ignored br
this Court. All of the evidence was improperly re·
ceived; consequently the appellant requests that the
case be remanded with instructions for re-trial in ac·
cordance with the appellant's position sought on appeal;
or, in the alternative, the appellant requests that this
Honorable Court reverse the judgment and conviction
and enter a judgment of acquittal.
Respectfully submitted,
Robert Van Seiver of
Karras, Van Seiver & Yocom
J imi Mitsunaga
Legal Defender
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